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Following the pivotal general elections held in Turkey on 
24 June 2018 and ahead of the European Parliament elec-
tions of May 2019, this policy brief explores options for 
the incoming High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy to renew European Union (EU) engage-
ment with Turkey. Assuming that the stalemate in acces-
sion negotiations will remain even after a new European 
Parliament and Commission will have been designated, it 
suggests that alternative forms of engagement are para-
mount for the EU.  
 
In a more “connected, contested and complex world” 
(High Representative 2016), EU-Turkey cooperation has 
become indispensable. However, it faces unprecedented 
challenges: the out-datedness of the Customs Union (CU) 
in the context of Turkey’s growing economic instability; 
the downgrade in its human rights and democratic rec-
ords; President Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian grip 
on Turkish society; and diverging security and foreign pol-
icies. 
 
This policy brief argues that the EU and Turkey should view 
these challenges as opportunities to pursue their interests 
together. After new European leaders emerge from the 
2019 elections, and especially a new High Representative, 
there will be a window of opportunity to reconsider policy 
options that reflect the indispensable relationship that 
binds the EU and Turkey. Combining analysis and policy 
recommendations, the policy brief advises that the EU’s 
leadership should promote a four-pillar approach to Tur-
key relying on: deeper economic integration; firm and in-
novative commitment to human rights, democracy and 
rule of law; coordinated responses to peace and security 
challenges in the Middle East; and enhanced implementa-
tion of the 2016 agreement on migration. 
 
Together to achieve shared prosperity 
 
Economic ties represent the greatest success of EU-Turkey 
relations. Since 1995, Turkey has participated in the CU, 
Executive Summary 
> Following turbulent years in European Union-Turkey 
relations, the June 2018 elections in Turkey and the 
prospective appointment of a new European Com-
mission following the 2019 European Parliament 
elections provide a window of opportunity to take 
stock of the deadlock in Turkey’s EU bid.  
> Incoming European leaders should engage in a pro-
found rethinking of EU-Turkey relations, beyond the 
accession perspective.  
> Concretely, the incoming Commission and especially 
High Representative should push for a renewal of EU 
strategic engagement with Turkey to ensure ‘togeth-
erness’ in addressing changing geopolitical, economic 
and security equilibria. This engagement should rely 
on a four-pillar, multidimensional approach: 
> Amid growing economic instability in Turkey, we 
suggest advancing towards an updated Customs 
Union, while seizing on Turkey’s potential as a 
central hub in the Southern Energy Corridor. 
> This strong economic asset could leverage further 
EU engagement on human rights, rule of law and 
democracy and enable the Union to adopt inno-
vative measures in support of Turkish civil soci-
ety. 
> International developments have positioned Tur-
key as a crucial, albeit ambivalent, foreign policy 
partner, especially in the Middle East. For this rea-
son, the EU should promote active foreign policy 
coordination and cooperation with Turkey.  
> Migration has been a rare, yet sensitive area of 
cooperation. In this domain, emphasis should be 
placed on enhancing the implementation of the 
2016 EU-Turkey Statement.  
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under which both partners benefit from common external 
tariffs for industrial goods and processed agricultural 
products. These arrangements have been of utmost im-
portance for Turkey’s transformation into a modern mar-
ket-based economy and for its impressive annual GDP 
growth for most part of late 1990s and the 2000s (World 
Bank 2018). As a result, the EU also remains Turkey’s pri-
mary trading partner, with 39% of imports and 73% of for-
eign direct investment into Turkey coming from the Union 
in 2016 (European Commission 2018; Mertzanis 2017). In 
return, the EU benefits from Turkish shipments of textiles 
and clothing, agricultural products, iron, steel and ever-in-
creasing Turkish investments in EU countries. However, 
more recently President Erdogan has been battling a struc-
turally flawed economy on the verge of a meltdown: in the 
context of Turkey’s longstanding economic and financial 
limitations (weakness of the domestic capital market, high 
borrowing rates, limited rise in productivity rates, fiscal 
mismanagement), the threat and use of sanctions by the 
United States (US) in August 2018 prior to the release of 
an American pastor and the refusal of the Central Bank to 
raise interest rates, have resulted in record lows for the 
Turkish lira.  
 
The two partners’ wider commercial relationship is addi-
tionally impacted by energy, with Turkey coming to be 
seen as a potential new transit country for gas and oil. The 
EU imports more than half of its primary energy resources 
from non-EU states and heavily relies on Russian natural 
gas and petroleum (37.4% and 30.9% of total supply re-
spectively, see Eurostat 2018). In an effort to diversify en-
ergy sources, the realization of the Southern Energy Corri-
dor is of vital importance to both sides. In addition to the 
commissioning of the South Caucasus pipeline in 2006, the 
inauguration of the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) 
in Turkey in June 2018 constituted a major step towards 
the completion of the Southern Gas Corridor, which would 
allow the transfer of natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe 
through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy. The 
remaining part of the Corridor consists in the project of 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), whose fate is now ques-
tioned by the current Italian government.  
 
The Southern Corridor may also transfer natural gas from 
Turkmenistan via the planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline, the 
construction of which is feasible after the recent success-
ful division of Caspian waters. Huge finds in the Eastern 
Mediterranean may further elevate Turkey’s role as a cen-
tral hub in the Southern Energy Corridor, although it re-
mains unclear how willing the EU will be to use Turkey’s 
infrastructure for gas transit, rather than Egypt’s already 
existing and strong infrastructure. 
 
The EU must consider these developments as a window of 
opportunity to build on existing economic ties and support 
Turkey in its path towards renewed stability:  
 
• To sustain and build on strong economic ties and 
shared benefits, the EU should first adopt a principled, 
pragmatic approach by advancing an updated CU. Con-
sensus in Turkey has long been to call for CU moderni-
zation to include agriculture, services and public pro-
curement, and visa liberalization to advance labour mi-
gration. Although EU Member States have argued for 
maintaining the CU as it is, progress achieved in Tur-
key’s path towards rule of law following the implemen-
tation of the CU in 1995 suggests that EU inflexibility on 
economic matters remains unwise (Alessandri, Lesser 
& Tastan 2018). The EU must stay firm on its criticism 
of Turkey’s human rights record, but the moderniza-
tion of the CU could be used as important leverage to 
pursue further economic gains for both parties, domes-
tic stability in Turkey, and greater strategic alignment. 
• The EU should seek energy diversification by pushing 
for the completion of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to 
strengthen cooperation with Turkey as a transit coun-
try. With the Southern Corridor operational starting in 
2020, energy pricing and cooperation could be key ne-
gotiating points in the updated CU. 
 
Together to safeguard democracy, rule of law and hu-
man rights 
 
Turkey’s domestic political landscape raises concerns, 
both in terms of its increasingly deteriorating rule of law 
framework and because of numerous human rights viola-
tions that have occurred following the failed coup in 2016. 
Moreover, the constitutional reform approved in the April 
2017 referendum has further watered down the powers of 
the judiciary and legislative branches, marking a historic 
shift in the country’s constitutional architecture from a 
parliamentary to a hyper-presidential system. President 
Erdogan’s re-election in June 2018, although with margins 
narrower than expected, has further increased his grip on 
the country. All of these trends highlight Turkey’s slide to-
wards ‘illiberal democracy’.  
 
At the same time, Turkish civil society is not yet equipped 
to act as a driver for change, although the EU has undeni-
able leverage in this area. It remains the most important 
donor for Turkish civil society, working actively to inte-
grate Syrian refugees, improve women’s rights, reduce 
ethnic tensions with the Kurds and combat radicalization, 
in particular through the EU’s Civil Society Facility and the 
European Instrument for Democracy.  
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As a global leader regarding democracy support, the EU 
must prevent a normalization of the recent democratic 
backsliding and move beyond a risk-averse approach to 
civil society cooperation, while remaining firm on main-
taining stable and democratic state institutions and taking 
all appropriate vetting measures so that under no circum-
stances support will be granted to entities with proven 
links to terrorist organizations. To this end, we suggest two 
courses of action: 
 
• It is paramount that European institutions be steadfast 
in insisting on Turkish commitment for the respect of 
human rights. In particular, the next High Representa-
tive should continue to raise concerns about human 
rights violations in any future high-level meetings, 
while other EU institutions, such as the European Par-
liament and the European Council, should display ac-
tive support for Turkey’s democratic system through 
official resolutions and statements. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that the Parliament has decided to defini-
tively cut the 70 million euros in pre-accession funds it 
had placed in reserve when the 2018 budget was ap-
proved in 2017. Moreover, it should be made clear in 
informal discussions that any advancement towards CU 
modernization should be met with an improvement of 
Turkey’s rule of law and human rights record. 
• The EU should also engage in a critical reassessment of 
its strategies to support Turkey’s civil society and aim 
at empowering grassroots political change. Moving 
away from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach – as reflected 
in most of the EU guidelines for civil society support –, 
the Union should consider supporting less formal civic 
groups. It should also encourage cooperation between 
civil society and the Turkish government, to facilitate 
inclusive and accountable policy-making. 
 
Together to address challenges stemming from the 
Middle East 
 
International developments, especially in the Middle East, 
have positioned Turkey as a key actor for global and re-
gional peace and security. Partnering with Turkey in terms 
of foreign policy remains more than ever indispensable for 
the EU in the context of shifting US policies towards the 
Middle East. However, European and Turkish strategic in-
terests seem to increasingly diverge on various issues. 
  
On security and defence issues, Turkey is an essential part-
ner in counter-terrorism given its geographical position. 
This partnership has consisted in bilateral cooperation and 
common multilateral efforts, notably in the international 
coalition against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) and between Turkey and the EU’s law en-
forcement agency Europol. However, Turkey's main red 
lines lie in the definition of terrorism, which is not shared 
by the EU: Turkey deems the Syrian Kurdish People's Pro-
tection Units (YPG) and the Gülen movement to be terror-
ist organizations, but the EU and the US do not subscribe 
to the same classification. This divergence led to tense ex-
changes between the Presidents of Turkey and the US in 
particular over the extradition of US-based Muhammed 
Fethullah Gülen, whom Turkey holds responsible for the 
2016 attempted coup. With the US and Turkey further 
growing apart, the EU is in a sensitive yet crucial position 
to uphold counter-terrorism cooperation.  
 
In terms of defence cooperation, Turkey’s position in the 
European geopolitical equilibrium seems to be shifting. 
Despite its NATO membership since 1952, recent develop-
ments such as the purchase of S-400 defence missiles from 
Russia have called Turkey’s place in the Alliance into ques-
tion in the context of the US’ mounting criticism of its 
NATO allies. At the same time, the activation of the Per-
manent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence 
(PESCO) by the EU has been a cause of concern for Turkey, 
which fears that it could weaken the Alliance. 
 
On broader foreign policy issues, Turkey shares the EU's 
preference for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict, but has turned into a vocal advocate for Pales-
tine and a harsh critic of Israel. In the Syrian conflict, Tur-
key has proved to be a key partner, but also waged military 
interventions in Northern Syria to fight US- and EU-backed 
Kurdish organizations. Meanwhile, Turkey has engaged 
with Iran and Russia within the Astana format over cease-
fire agreements and de-escalation zones, resulting in the 
17 September 2018 Sochi Agreement aimed at preventing 
a humanitarian disaster in Idlib. This demonstrates how 
crucial Turkey is in counterbalancing Russia’s and Iran’s in-
volvement in the region. Regarding Iran, Turkey, like the 
EU, remains committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action allowing for the lifting of international sanctions 
in exchange for the end of Iran’s military nuclear pro-
gramme and thorough international monitoring of its civil-
ian nuclear programme. As such, Turkey has been vocal in 
criticizing US President Trump’s withdrawal from the nu-
clear deal. However, it remains unclear how Turkey will be 
affected by the reinstatement of US sanctions, in particu-
lar on oil, for the US might grant Turkey an exemption to 
such sanctions. 
 
This blurred context is likely to worsen given President Er-
dogan’s feud with President Trump and the country’s long-
ing for influence in the region. Therefore, the EU – to the 
extent it has the competence to do so – should step in as 
the guarantor of Turkey’s alignment with Western inter-
ests in the Middle East and uphold European interests in 
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the region at a moment when US policies tend to follow an 
increasingly conflicting path: 
 
• First, the EU should push for the coordination of its 
Member States’ diplomatic and military actions with 
Turkey to take advantage of shared goals and facilitate 
strategic alignment. In this regard, the incoming High 
Representative should promote joint efforts towards 
the two-state solution in the Near East (e.g. scaling up 
support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees, now that the US has cancelled 
its funding). Further, to advance towards a political so-
lution in Syria, the EU should foster Turkey’s participa-
tion in the Brussels Conferences on supporting the fu-
ture of Syria and the region and build on the country’s 
engagement with Russia by replicating the 27 October 
2018 meeting between Russia, Turkey, France and Ger-
many.  
• On other specific security challenges, the EU should 
also push for further EU-Turkey cooperation. Regarding 
counter-terrorism, cooperation is essential given the 
enduring threat of lone fighters and ISIL. The new High 
Representative should especially promote infor-
mation-sharing by fast-tracking negotiations on the ex-
change of personal data between Europol and Turkey. 
On broader military and defence issues, PESCO could 
seek to include Turkey on a case-by-case basis in rele-
vant military projects. 
 
Together to address the challenges of migration 
 
Migration has been an important, although controversial, 
area of cooperation between the EU and Turkey. The 2016 
EU-Turkey Statement is the defining aspect of relations in 
this area. In simplified form, Turkey agreed to take back 
irregular migrants crossing into Greece in exchange for fi-
nancial aid and expedited visa liberalization. The immedi-
ate goal has been met: sea arrivals along the Eastern Med-
iterranean route, from Turkey to Greece, are down to 
24,821 for 2018 (UNHCR 2018). However, implementation 
has been flawed. Greek facilities that house asylum-seek-
ers remain overcrowded, integration of Syrian refugees 
into Turkish labour markets has been insufficient and visa 
liberalization talks are stalled. 
 
Despite these challenges, and although President Erdogan 
has complained about the rate at which EU funds are dis-
bursed, the Agreement will likely survive. For the EU, back-
ing out could result in a surge of refugees from Turkey, for 
which it is ill-prepared. For Turkey, reneging would cost fi-
nancial assistance and visa liberalization, as European pub-
lics would not forgive Turkey for allowing a new wave of 
refugees across the Aegean.  
 
Against this backdrop, the EU should focus its efforts on 
working with Turkey to enhance implementation of the 
deal and on improving internal coordination on migration: 
 
• To improve together refugee integration in Turkey, the 
new High Representative should first lobby the Turkish 
government to amend certain policies, such as munici-
pal funding that does not factor in the number of refu-
gees living in a given district, and relax its over-central-
ization of migration management. This would allow for 
a greater role of local governments and civil society, 
who have shown in Europe that they can take the lead 
on refugee integration, thanks to their better 
knowledge of local contexts. The EU has one other 
lever to pull: through its Facility for Refugees in Turkey 
(FRT), it can choose how to allocate the second round 
of Agreement funds (3 billion euros). The High Repre-
sentative should insist that these new funds focus on 
socioeconomic support, for example by financing pro-
grammes that support refugee self-employment and 
small businesses, invest in vocational training, and 
adopt best practices from European countries, like Ger-
many’s ‘one-stop service points’ (Selin Okyay 2017). 
• At the same time, the EU must prepare for the unlikely 
event that the Agreement collapses by improving its 
own coordination on migration, first by taking practical 
steps to address the abhorrent conditions in Greek asy-
lum facilities, such as amending the 2018 European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) Operating Plan to pro-
vide more than the planned 170 caseworkers, a clearly 
insufficient number. Furthermore, additional funds 
could be allocated from the formal EU budget to migra-
tion-related emergencies, thereby obviating the need 
for ad-hoc arrangements like emergency EU Trust 
Funds or the FRT.  Although it is likely not politically 
tenable, the new Commission should also strongly con-
sider activating the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme to expedite resettlement, while the incoming 
High Representative should further advocate for re-
placing the Dublin Regulation system with a new Reset-
tlement Framework. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both the EU and Turkey enter a more complex era of 
changing geopolitics, face increasingly divergent US poli-
cies and battle stagnating or even faltering economies. In 
this context, both should acknowledge the indispensability 
of their relationship, which cannot be taken for granted 
but must instead be equipped to meet the increasing chal-
lenges of our times. Only together can they build a resilient 
and mutually beneficial partnership. For the EU, a stronger 
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partnership with Turkey will help advance sustainable eco-
nomic growth, increase Europeans’ security, safeguard 
their interests and uphold their values in a changing world, 
while adopting adequate responses to key challenges such 
as migration. 
 
The European Union must thus accept that Turkey’s EU 
candidacy status has failed to secure lasting strategic align-
ment. Turning the page of this deadlocked process, the EU 
should pursue an alternative style of engagement: prag-
matic and flexible when possible, firm and principled when 
necessary, comprehensive and ambitious at all times. In 
the window before the next Turkish elections in 2023, and 
with a new European Commission, Parliament and espe-
cially High Representative in 2019, the EU can either capi-
talize on a relatively stable political situation in Turkey, or 
let an opportunity for renewed cooperation slip away. 
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